We consider the collective eavesdropping of the BB84 and six-state protocols. Since these protocols are symmetric in the eigenstates of conjugate bases, we consider collective attacks having the same kind of symmetry. We then show how these symmetric collective attacks are sufficiently strong in order to minimize the Devetak-Winter rates. In fact, it is quite easy to construct simple examples able to reach the unconditionally-secure key-rates of these protocols.
II. THE BB84 PROTOCOL AND ITS SYMMETRIC EAVESDROPPING
In the BB84 protocol [6] , two honest users (Alice and Bob) randomly choose between two conjugate bases, i.e., the Z-basis {|0 , |1 } (the eigenstates of the Pauli operator Z) and the X-basis {|+ , |− } (the eigenstates |± = 2 −1/2 (|0 ± |1 ) of the Pauli operator X). Alice encodes a logical bit into her basis σ A = Z ∨ X according to the mapping0 = |0 ∨ |+ and1 = |1 ∨ |− . The signal state |u with u = {0, 1, +, −} is then sent to Bob through the noisy channel E, who will project the output state ρ B (u) := E (|u u|) onto his basis σ B = Z ∨ X in order to decode Alice's logical bit. At the end of the quantum communication, Alice and Bob publicly agree a random permutation of their binary data (called the raw key). Then, they disclose all their bases (basis reconciliation) and keep only the compatible data, forming the so-called sifted key. Such a key is still affected by errors due to the noise of the channel and the corresponding error rate is called QBER (for quantum bit error rate). The QBER is computed during the subsequent error estimation, where the honest users publicly compare a (small) random subset of the sifted key. From the knowledge of the QBER, the honest users can bound the amount of information potentially stolen by an eavesdropper (Eve). In particular, if the QBER is below a certain security threshold, then Alice and Bob can apply procedures of error correction and privacy amplification in order to derive a final secret and error-free binary key. In a collective attack, Eve probes each signal qubit using a fresh ancilla, which is then stored in a cell of a quantum memory coherently measured at the end of the protocol. In particular, such a coherent measurement is also optimized on every classical communication used by Alice and Bob during the protocol like, e.g., the basis reconciliation. As a consequence, Eve has an a posteriori knowledge of the basis (Z or X) which was used for each signal qubit. On the one hand, Eve can exploit this knowledge in the final detection [7] , on the other hand, she cannot exploit it for a conditional optimization of the signal-ancilla interactions (which, of course, have been already occurred). Since the usage of the two conjugate bases is perfectly symmetric in the BB84 protocol, the optimal eavesdropping strategy should consist in signal-ancilla interactions which are symmetric in the eigenstates of these conjugate bases.
Let us explicitly construct this kind of symmetric interaction. According to the Stinespring dilation theorem [8] , the quantum channel E acting on the signal qubit can be represented by a unitary interactionÛ coupling the signal qubit with two ancillary qubits initially prepared in the vacuum state (such a representation is also minimal and unique up to partial isometries). Then, for every input u = {0, 1, +, −}, we can write the following signal-ancilla unitary interactionÛ
where u ⊕ 1 = {1, 0, −, +} and the output ancillas (F and D's) are generally not orthogonal neither normalized. Now, the condition of symmetry in the four eigenstates |u reduces the number of possible unitariesÛ . In particular, by imposing the conditions
one makesÛ symmetric and Eq. (1) a Schmidt form. The Stinespring dilation of Eq. (1) under the conditions of Eq. (2) defines the notion of symmetric attack, which is then individual or collective depending on the kind of measurement performed by Eve on her quantum memory. The corresponding action on the Alice-Bob channel is given by the map
describing a uniform contraction by F − D of the signal states, which is here equivalent to the contraction of the equator of the Bloch sphere [5] . From Eq. (3) it is clear that parameter F represents the fidelity while D is the QBER. As a consequence, Alice and Bob's mutual information is simply given by
Let us now consider the output state ρ E (u) which is received by Eve in the complementary Alice-Eve channel E : |u u| → ρ E (u). This is equal to
where the normalized states |f u := F −1/2 |F u and |d u := D −1/2 |D u have been introduced. In case of collective attack, this output state is subject to an optimal coherent measurement involving all the cells of the quantum memory. Since Eve has the a posteriori knowledge of the basis, her coherent measurement has to discriminate between the two states of the quantum ensemble
It is known that the maximal amount of classical information (accessible information) that Eve can steal from this ensemble is upper-bounded by the Holevo information
where S(ρ) := −Tr (ρ log 2 ρ) is the Von Neumann entropy. As a consequence, the secret-key rate is lower bounded by the Devetak-Winter rate [4] R DW := I AB − χ AE .
Since
. By exploiting this expression and I AB = 1 − H(D), the Devetak-Winter rate for a symmetric collective attack simply becomes
where only S(ρ E ) remains to be computed. Following Gisin et al. [5] , let us simplify the structure of the symmetric attack by imposing the additional conditions
with x and y real numbers. Such conditions imply
so thatÛ is not only symmetric but also completely determined by two angles x and y. In particular, we can realize all the conditions in Eqs. (2) and (9) 
Let us denote by S(x, y) the symmetric collective attack specified by the interaction of Eq. (11) . Then, it is easy to prove that the attack S(x, x) has a Devetak-Winter rate equal to
which corresponds exactly to the unconditionally-secure key-rate of the BB84 protocol [9] (with unconditional security threshold D ≃ 11% as given by 1 − 2H(D) = 0).
Proof of Eq. (12).
In order to prove the rate of Eq. (12) we have to compute the entropy S(ρ E ) in Eq. (8) by exploiting the properties of the attack S(x, x), which are simply given by conditions of Eqs. (2) and (9) with x = y. By introducing the states
we can recast the average state ρ E of Eq. (5) in the form ρ E = F ρ F + Dρ D , so that it can be equivalently seen as the average state of the quantum ensembleQ
From Eqs. (2) and (9) we easily derive that ρ F and ρ D are orthogonal, i.e., Tr(ρ F ρ D ) = 0. As a consequence, we have
In order to extract S(ρ E ) from Eq. (15), we have to compute the two entropies S(ρ F ) and S(ρ D ). For computing S(ρ F ) let us introduce the orthonormal set {|f u , f with ϕ arbitrary phase, so that
By means of a suitable unitary we then get
where
and N 2 ± = 1+(1 + cos 2x ± 2 |cos x|) 2 (csc 2x) 2 . Since Φ + |Φ − = 0, we simply achieve
. In order to compute the other entropy S(ρ D ), we just introduce an analogous orthonormal set {|d u , d 
III. THE SIX-STATE PROTOCOL AND ITS SYMMETRIC EAVESDROPPING
In the BB84 protocol the signal states represent the four equidistant poles lying on the equator of the Bloch sphere. In order to enhance the security, one can then think to saturate the sphere by including the exploitation of the remaining two poles. This is done in the six-state protocol [10] where also the basis {|R , |L } := 2 −1/2 {|0 + i |1 , |0 − i |1 } of the third Pauli operator Y = iXZ is exploited in both Alice's random encoding and Bob's random decoding. The six-state protocol is then formulated like the BB84 protocol except that now we have three bases {Z, X, Y } and, therefore, six possible signal states {|u ; u = 0, 1, +, −, R, L} encoding a logical qubit according to the mapping0 = |0 ∨ |+ ∨ |R and1 = |1 ∨ |− ∨ |L .
Since the six-state protocol is a symmetric extension of the BB84 to the third Pauli operator, we consider the same extension for the symmetric attacks. This means that an arbitrary symmetric attack against the six-state protocol is defined by Eqs. (1) and (2) where now u = {0, 1, +, −, R, L}. The corresponding channel is again described by Eq. (3) which now corresponds to a uniform contraction by F − D of all the Bloch sphere. It is trivial to check that a symmetric collective attack against the six-state protocol is characterized by the same Devetak-Winter rate of Eq. (8), exactly as before [11] .
Let us construct a simple example for the explicit computation of this rate. We can simplify the structure of the attack by imposing the conditions of Eq. (9) for all the bases, i.e., for u = {0, 1, +, −, R, L}. All these conditions imply now Eq. (10) together with 1 + F cos x − D cos y = 2F , which are simultaneously satisfied if and only if y = π/2. As a consequence, we have
and the unitary interactionÛ is completely determined by a single angle x. In particular, we can realize all the previous conditions by choosing the ancillas of Eq. (11) with y = π/2, i.e.,
where also |D 0 and |D 1 are orthogonal. Let us denote byS(x) the symmetric collective attack specified by the interaction of Eq. (20). Then, it is easy to prove thatS(x) has a Devetak-Winter rate equal to
which corresponds exactly to the unconditionally-secure key-rate of the six-state protocol [12] (with unconditional security threshold D ≃ 12.6%).
Proof of Eq. (21).
In order to get the result we have to compute S(ρ E ) for the simple attackS(x). Eve's output state ρ E (u) has the same form of Eq. (4). Thus, the average state ρ E can be again recasted in terms of the states ρ D and ρ F of Eq. (13), in such a way to represent the same quantum ensembleQ of Eq. (14). As a consequence, the entropy S(ρ E ) can be again extracted from of Eq. 
which is equivalent to the result of Eq. (21).
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have considered very simple collective attacks against the BB84 and six-state protocols, which are constructed by trivially extending the individual symmetric attacks of Gisin et al. [5] . Such symmetric collective attacks have been proven to be sufficiently strong in order to minimize the Devetak-Winter rates of these protocols. In fact, it has been shown how to construct simple examples able to reach their unconditionally-secure key-rates. Our results can be useful in the cryptoanalysis of other QKD protocols which are based on the symmetric exploitation of the vertices of regular polygons or polyhedrons embedded in the Bloch sphere.
